Political consumer activism and democratic legitimacy by Beckstein, Martin








Political consumer activism and democratic legitimacy
Beckstein, Martin
Abstract: This article discusses consumer activism not as an ethical, but as a political phenomenon.
A political concept of consumer activism implies, first, that consumers sometimes express support or
opposition to products and services or consumer and business practices at least partly in order to advance
nonmarket agendas, and, second, that consumer activism in the economic sphere occasionally has palpable
impact on the organization of social life. Early contributors to the debate were optimistic that political
consumer activism might be able to extend democracy into the economic sphere. In recent years, however,
scholars have increasingly voiced misgivings about this, arguing that political consumer activism may
suffer from a democratic deficit: it may amount to an impermissible form of vigilantism or facilitate
the illegitimate conversion of market power into political power. This article systematizes and reassesses
these concerns, focusing in particular on arguments that dispute the compatibility of political consumer
activism with liberal democracy as a procedural ideal. I conclude that political consumer activism does
not face problems to do with legitimacy in this regard, most importantly because money does not play
a more important role in market-based politics than in official democratic processes. Political consumer
activism takes many forms, yet it is hardly ever about voting with the pocketbook.
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This article discusses consumer activism not as an ethical, but
as a political phenomenon. A political concept of consumer
activism implies, first, that consumers sometimes express
support or opposition to products and services or consumer
and business practices at least partly in order to advance
nonmarket agendas, and, second, that consumer activism in the
economic sphere occasionally has palpable impact on the
organization of social life. Early contributors to the debate were
optimistic that political consumer activism might be able to
extend democracy into the economic sphere. In recent years,
however, scholars have increasingly voiced misgivings about
this, arguing that political consumer activism may suffer from
a democratic deficit: it may amount to an impermissible form
of vigilantism or facilitate the illegitimate conversion of market
power into political power. This article systematizes and
reassesses these concerns, focusing in particular on arguments
that dispute the compatibility of political consumer activism
with liberal democracy as a procedural ideal. I conclude that
political consumer activism does not face problems to do with
legitimacy in this regard, most importantly because money
does not play a more important role in market-based politics
than in official democratic processes. Political consumer
activism takes many forms, yet it is hardly ever about voting
with the pocketbook.
Introduction
In Rob VanAlkemade’s 2007 documentary What Would Jesus Buy? a young
girl is asked about the Messiah’s hypothetical shopping preferences. After a
moment’s reflection, she answers: ‘The X-Box 360!’ Two things are going on
in this scene: first, entertainment, with an unsuspecting interviewee being
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lead up the garden path by a rhetorical question. Second, a slightly
paternalistic case is made for ethical consumerism by suggesting that mature
and reflective individuals must overcome infantile naïveté and understand
that our consumption behavior ought to be shaped by moral considerations.
While moral philosophers have good reason to address consumer activism
and discuss the moral duties (and their limits) that individuals have when
entering the marketplace, to political philosophers, the relevance of this
activism is not beyond doubt. 
Politically speaking, some authors claim, consumer activism matters
little, arguing that it is more about feeling good than doing good (Blühdorn,
2006: 36; West, 2004: 1; Žižek, 2010: 236). But what if consumer activists could
occasionally make a difference and generate effects that have an impact on
social life? Should we, then, welcome consumer activism as a novel kind of
political participation¾one that carries democracy into the economic sphere?
Might consumer activism be a good substitute for conventional forms of
political participation, such as elections or party membership, that are in
decline? Although early contributors to the debate have answered these
questions in the affirmative (Hertz, 2002; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2002), recent
scholars have raised doubts. For instance, Føllesdal et al. (2006: 295) ask their
readers not to forget that ‘political consumerism can go wrong.’ Stolle and
Hooghe (2006: 284) remark that political consumer activism has ‘truly
worrisome democratic implications.’ For Hussain (2012: 112), finally,
political consumer activism may well amount to an ‘impermissible form of
vigilantism’ that cannot claim ‘a rightful place in the practices of a liberal
democratic society.’ This article reassesses these concerns, focusing in
particular on arguments that dispute the compatibility of political consumer
activism with liberal democracy as a procedural ideal. 
The suspicion of democratic illegitimacy is not self-explanatory.
Because consumption choices, even if motivated by normative
considerations other than price–quality evaluation, are traditionally
understood to be a private affair, the first section of this article accounts for
the political relevance of consumer activism. The growing relevance of
consumer activism in affluent societies is highlighted and a concept of
political consumer activism is established that provides criteria for
distinguishing it from non-political practices of ethical consumerism. On this
basis, the second section explains why political consumer activism cannot
lean on the same justification as other informal kinds of political
participation such as demonstrations or even lobbying: political consumer
activism is not always geared towards official processes of democratic
legislation, but instead often seeks to circumvent or even replace it. It is
necessary, then, to question the normative justification of political consumer
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activism. The third section systematically reassesses whether political
consumer activism infringes on the procedural values of democratic
morality. The concluding section summarizes that the suspicion of
illegitimacy does not withstand scrutiny, and spells out two implications
that follow, one concerning the popular¾and misleading¾equation of
political consumer activism with shopping for change and one concerning
the allegedly antagonistic relationship between political consumer activists
and business and state actors. Thus, investigation into the compatibility of
political consumer activism and the procedural values of democratic
morality proves to be important not only to counterbalance the remarks of
recent critics. It also helps us to broaden our understanding of political
consumer activism and relativize the impression that it is ultimately about
voting with the pocketbook. Finally, this broadening of our perspective on
political consumer activism may serve to shift the attention of future inquiry
from economic actors to state actors, to the ways by which governments
politicize economic life, and thus to foster market-based political activism.
1 – From ethical consumerism to political consumer activism
In debates about political economy, the economic sphere is usually
considered a site of activism. The logic of the market, it is often suggested,
crowds out normative considerations that go beyond price–quality
evaluations. Instead of being embedded in social life, the economy under
conditions of modern capitalism is disembedded. What’s worse, the
economy enmeshes other spheres of the social world by imposing a market
logic and ‘imprisoning’ citizens’ attempts to improve it (Polanyi, 1977: 10;
2001: 57–68; Lindblom, 1982: 327; see also Dahl, 1985: 101; Dunn, 2007: 6;
Gilpin, 1987: 77; Habermas, 2004: 500; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 161). The
idea that there is a trend towards the commercialization of social life is
certainly plausible. At the same time, it is obvious that views that generalize
the dominance of the logic of the market in the economic sphere and
elsewhere are highly questionable. On the one hand, feminist economists
have emphasized that economic relations in today’s affluent societies are not
wholly organized in a market capitalist way. Transactions in household
economies, neighborhood markets, or file-sharing networks are commonly
displaced into the ‘informal’ fringe of economic life precisely because they
do not exhibit the characteristics of either market or capitalist relations
(Gibson-Graham, 2006: 56; see also Watkins, 1998). On the other hand,
neither does the ‘formal’ economy consistently operate according to the self-
regulating logic attributed to markets. Wolfgang Streeck’s (2012) recent
remarks on commercialization in the late 20th century instructively elucidate
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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this point. 
Streeck is alarmed by the observation that the logic of the market is
increasingly colonizing social life. In particular, he fears that the market
substantially commercializes our societies by exporting personal taste and
temporary idle preferences as the guiding principles of action to all other
social spheres. Social identities run the risk of becoming structured ‘by
weaker and looser ties, allowing individuals to surf from one identity to the
next, free from any pressure to explain themselves,’ with the result that
democratic politics stand to be transformed into politainment, with citizens
buying public goods rather than negotiating policies that fit into a collective
project (Streeck, 2012: 36, 44–6). Hence, like critical scholars before him,
Streeck apprehends that the self-regulating mechanism of the market
enmeshes social relations, whereas it should be the other way around. Yet
Streeck’s analysis does not stop there. In addition to the commercialization
tendency in public life, he observes that economic relations have also
undergone significant transformations in late modernity, and that these
transformations have created new opportunities for sociation
(‘Vergesellschaftung’) within the economic sphere. 
The economic stagnation of the early 1970s, Streeck explains, was due
to a widespread saturation of society with mass-produced, standardized
consumer durables. To overcome this stagnation, production had to adjust
to the more exacting demands of consumers while the advertising industry
did its bit to develop consumers’ sense for more exacting desires.
Technological progress made a number of shifts possible: from Fordism to
post-Fordism, need-supplying to want-supplying economies, sellers’ to
buyers’ markets, saturated to affluent societies; and the diversification and
customization of products created unprecedented possibilities for
individuals in the economic sphere to ‘link up with others and thereby define
their place in the world’ (Streeck, 2012: 35). These new opportunities for
sociation might be problematic for various reasons, as Streeck is eager to
underline, but they nevertheless open up room for aesthetic and normative
considerations that go beyond price–quality evaluations. Hence, the
economic sphere, in particular under conditions of late modern capitalism,
is a potential site for activism. 
Empirical data confirm this consideration. At least since The Body
Shop founder Anita Roddick made a fortune by selling animal-friendly
cosmetics, a significant number of consumers display a willingness to take
ethical factors into account when making purchasing decisions. Today, this
willingness seems to be more prevalent than ever in affluent societies.
Surveys conducted in the Unites States, Australia, Europe, and elsewhere
show that growing numbers of people claim to have brought their
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consumption behavior in line with normative commitments (Cowe and
Williams, 2000; Littler, 2009: 29, 76; Pattie et al., 2003: 446; Pattie et al., 2004:
78). In addition, statistics indicate that markets for ‘ethical’ products,
services, and funds are booming (Fairtrade International, 2011; Lee and
Vihinen, 2005: 4–5; see also Celent, 2007). These empirical trends suggest that
the consumer can no longer be adequately characterized either as ‘rational
egoistic economic man’ or a ‘dupe of hidden persuaders.’ Scholars have
therefore urged us to consider conceptions of the consumer as an ‘activist’
or ‘moral agent,’ and, most remarkably, as responsibility-taking ‘citizen-
consumer’ (Micheletti et al., 2006: xiv; Scammell, 2000: 354). 
The notion of a citizen-consumer gives expression to the idea that
consumer practices might be a concern not only for moral philosophers but
for democratic theorists too. However, consumption behavior does not
become a political phenomenon simply because consumers take normative
considerations into account when entering the market place. As such, a
conceptual distinction is required to differentiate political consumer activism
from ethical consumerism.1
The term citizen-consumer¾the label denoting the potentially political
role of the consumer¾is apparently inspired by the consumer-sovereignty
hypothesis in economics: if consumers in the market are like the people of a
democratic polity by virtue of their commanding supply, so the underlying
consideration seems to state, then consumption on an individual level is
similar to going to the polls. Boris Holzer accordingly writes:
[T]here is a remarkable structural homology between
democratic elections and consumptions choices [...] the act of
shopping allows for the timely expression of highly specialized
and individualized prefer ences—including aesthetic, religious
and political ones. For the individual consumer, political
consumerism comes close to a ‘very immediate democratic
process’ (Holzer, 2003: 413; quoted in Nava, 1991: 168). 2
However, Leo Strauss (1988: 14) made clear that ‘buying a shirt, as
distinguished from casting a vote, is not in itself a political action.’ Strauss
is right, because the vote is a share of sovereignty, and therefore a political
instrument, whereas buying a shirt is a market transaction without a
guaranteed political impact. At the same time, the political value of suffrage
resides primarily in its capacity to symbolize citizens’ egalitarian entitlement
to political participation. In terms of power, a vote matters little in modern
mass democracies given that the one-person-one-vote rule simultaneously
guarantees a minimal share of power and limits the influence it can
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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maximally achieve to 1/n. The political impact of market transactions, in
contrast, is determined neither in regard to what they minimally achieve nor
what they might maximally achieve. Now, if we are to avoid restating the
truism that everything is political, which is analytically worthless after all,
the point of political consumer activism cannot be simply to imitate
democratic elections. Instead of secretly adding 1/n to the collective count
of aggregate demand, the goal must be to motivate other agents to modify
their consumption behavior, to influence how business actors provide which
products and services, to address policymakers, or to impact in other ways
upon social life. Thus I suggest that we think of ethical consumerism as
consumption behavior that is primarily introverted, as expressed in the
advice offered by Gandhi, who said that we should be the change we want
to see in the world. Simply buying, individually, a fair trade product falls
into this category of ‘introverted’ ethical consumerism. Political consumer
activism, in contrast, aims at advancing some partisan agenda by surpassing
the additive arithmetic of an individual action’s impact and triggering
multiplicative effects on social life, for instance by organizing a boycott.3 That
said, an activist’s public aspirations must also be realistic, that is, the
activist’s hope of influencing social life must be based on a reasonable
strategy as well as a somewhat plausible theory of causation. The normative
question arising from the phenomenon of political consumer activism, in
contrast to ethical consumerism, is thus not in the moral desirability of
various partisan agendas, but rather in the result of making inroads on the
organization of social life.4
2 – Why might political consumer activism suffer from a democratic
deficit?
The question of whether political consumer activism is democratically
problematic plausibly rests upon the assumption that politics in a liberal-
democratic society should generally comply with certain procedural values
of liberal democratic morality. Even though there is considerable room for
discussion about how democratic and liberal principles are best
implemented in practice, it is fair to say that the political systems in Western
affluent societies by and large meet the requirements of non-ideal democratic
theory. Accordingly, ‘formal’ kinds of political participation such as voting,
petitioning, running for office, or parliamentary debate are legitimate in
these societies by virtue of taking place in a consolidated liberal-democratic
political system. Many ‘informal’ instruments of political activism, such as
demonstrations or moderate forms of lobbying, are also democratically
unproblematic as long as they do not infringe upon existing law. Even
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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though they are not an immediate part of the official political process of
democratic lawmaking, they are still geared towards it. Many examples of
political consumer activism work by exactly the same logic, for instance,
when consumer activists advocate stricter legal regulations of foreign trade.
As such, such political consumer activism can claim a rightful place in a
liberal-democratic society. Yet what about forms of political consumer
activism that are not geared towards official processes of democratic
lawmaking?
For a long time political theorists were not aware of the existence of
political activism that aimed to influence social life without being related to
governmental decision-making. More accurately, such activism was not
conceptualized in terms of politics. Sidney Verba and Norman S. Nie’s (1962:
2) oft-cited definition of political participation, for instance, says that
activities of private citizens acquire a political quality if they are ‘more or
less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel
and/or the actions they take.’ However, since Carl Schmitt challenged state-
centric conceptions of politics by pointing out that politics had been
centralized within the official sphere of politics only under absolutism,
scholars have increasingly acknowledged the diffusion of the political to
actors outside and inside the nation-state.5 And it is worth mentioning that
Verba and Nie themselves admit (in the paragraph following their definition)
that political activism does not always need to take a detour through
governments: ‘attempts to influence the authoritative allocations of values
for a society […] may or may not take place through governmental
decisions.’ Ways of influencing the authoritative allocation of values in a
society, outside of governmental decisions, may simply circumvent
democratic legislation, or additionally aim to replace democratic lawmaking.
New modes of governance such as public–private or private–private
partnerships set standards that potentially serve as functional substitutes for
state-based law. In any case, political activism that does not take a detour
through democratic legislation but instead establishes social norms
surrounding what may and may not be done, motivate norm compliance by
the promise of social recognition, and set negative incentives against non-
compliance by the threat of social ostracism or by exerting bargaining power. 
Not least because of the additional leverage of financial pressure,
major political philosophers consider extra-legislative ways of influencing
social life especially problematic if they grow out of the economic sphere.
Michael Walzer (1983; 1984: 322), for instance, made a famous case for more
effectively ‘walling in’ the economic sphere. Liberal democratic societies, he
argues, ought to make greater efforts to prevent transformational
processes¾‘social alchemy’¾by which economic power is converted into
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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political power. In cases where the exercise of political power cannot be fully
contained within the sphere of politics, democratization is needed. For
instance, the managerial structures of companies must be democratized,
according to Walzer, because some companies constitute ‘private
governments’ due to their sustained ‘control over the destinations and risks
of other people.’6 Benjamin Barber (2004; 2007: 290, Ch. 7) has concluded that
political consumer activists who evade the official political process weaken
democracy instead of strengthening it, even if animated by the best
intentions. He therefore thinks that we must ‘restor[e] the sovereignty of
citizens over consumption.’ For Waheed Hussain (2012: 112), finally, the
legitimate use of political consumer activism must at least be restricted:
consumers must ‘treat their buying choices as […] a kind of ongoing,
informal prologue to formal democratic lawmaking.’ Only by fulfilling this
‘proto-legislative requirement,’ does political consumer activism ‘respect the
privileged position of formal democratic politics and […] can therefore claim
a rightful place in the practices of a liberal democratic society.’ Otherwise, it
simply amounts to an ‘impermissible form of vigilantism.’7 The message
from these three thinkers is clear: the economy is a site that allows for the
exercise of political power; and to be legitimate such economic exertion of
political power must be integrated into the process of public will-formation
preceding democratic legislation—at least unless they do not themselves
comply with the principles of liberal democracy.8 The next section assesses
whether extra-legislative forms of political consumer activism are indeed
prone to infringing on these principles.
3 – Suspicions of democratic illegitimacy
The literature suggests that (extra-legislative) political consumer activism
infringes on three principles of liberal democracy in particular: first, political
consumer activism does not provide a setting that facilitates deliberation, so
that any political outcomes are not determined by reasonable arguments;
second, people do not enjoy equality of opportunity when trying to influence
issues of common concern by means of political consumer activism; finally,
political consumer activism can indirectly, yet effectively, deprive persons
and groups of their basic liberties. In what follows, I consider each concern
in turn. If the concerns withhold scrutiny, we shall have reason to oppose
an unrestricted use of political consumer activism and will be in a position
to specify which forms of political consumer activism are democratically
problematic.
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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3.1 Politics without discussion?
Ideally, in a democracy, political outcomes should be determined by the best
argument. Yet political consumer activism that does not aim to inform
democratic lawmaking in this way, critics feel, and often does not even
initiate debate. Political consumer activism is about shopping, not arguing,
for change (See e.g. Hussain, 2012: 120-1; Streeck, 2012: 35; Teorell et al., 2007:
342). Such generalizations, however, are invalid. It is fair to say that regional
or fair-trade labels do in fact invite the consumer to enter into a dialogue,
arguing (if cryptically) that the labeled products are preferable to others on
the grounds of lower pollutant emissions from transport or better labor
conditions for workers. To give a second example, culture jammers do not
simply destroy or negate a company’s advertisement but rather challenge
the advertiser’s effort at persuasion by parodying the original message and
adding a critical thought for consideration (e.g. ‘McDonald’s¾I’m lovin’
profit’).9 Quite generally, political consumers rather frequently employ
shaming strategies that aim to rhetorically entrap firms by revealing
corporate lip service and highlighting failures to comply with their own
philosophy. The deliberative quality in many cases of political consumer
activism is certainly disputable, but it cannot plausibly be denied in toto.10
Drawing on Albert O. Hirschman’s famous distinction, we have to at
least admit that ‘voice-based’ forms of political consumer activism are far
less problematic in this regard than ‘exit-based’ forms:
Some customers stop buying the firm’s products or leave the
organization: this is the exit option. As a result, revenues drop,
membership declines, and management is impelled to search
for ways and means to correct whatever faults have led to exit.
The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express
their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other
authority to which management is subordinate or through
general protest addressed at anyone who cares to listen: this is
the voice option. As a result, management once again engages
in a search for the causes and possible cures of customers’ and
members’ dissatisfaction. (Hirschman, 1981: 4)
Accepting this distinction for a moment, we can infer that an absence of
deliberation is characteristic of exit-based forms of political consumer
activism. In boycotts and buycotts or conscientious everyday shopping
behavior, consumers withdraw from a relationship with one provider in
favor of a relationship with another, without giving explanations to either
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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side. They might not even send a clear signal about their changed
preferences, but simply stop buying. Later I will suggest that the concept of
the ‘exit option’ misses something important if it is applied to political
consumer activism without modification. At this point, it suffices to highlight
that Hirschman’s distinction implies that political consumer activism, even
if it is sometimes essentially non-deliberative, cannot be ruled out simply on
the basis of the procedural value of democratic deliberation. Exit is not just
an option in the market, but in the political sphere, too. Put in more general
terms, the official political process in democracy does not always include
deliberation. Neither is it clear that all politics in a democracy are
deliberative, and nor why they should be. A functioning democracy requires
a decision procedure, and deliberation is ill-suited for that purpose. Because
it ‘is simply unrealistic to expect any moderately large group to come to
complete consensus, however long they talk together’ (Goodin 2012, 108; see
also Przeworski 1998, 141), deliberation must be supplemented by some non-
deliberative procedure such as voting. In their capacity as voters, citizens
cast ballots without giving reasons. For other practices of official politics
deliberation is inessential. Protesters in a demonstration, for instance, need
not weigh arguments; they may simply signal their opposition to a policy in
order to raise awareness or energize supporters. Campaign volunteers may
simply ask for signatures or money from people who already have sympathy
for the campaign. Deliberation plays an important role in official politics,
but it cannot hope to exhaust it, not least because arguments by themselves
cannot make decisions or take actions—which is to say, rule—but only
inform political action and decision-making (Walzer, 1999). Ideally, the
decisions of campaign volunteers, protesters, and voters to become
politically active are the result of a rational process of discussion among free
and equal citizens. The same applies to decisions on the part of political
consumer activists to support or oppose a business practice, and there is
insufficient reason to assume that boycotters and conscientious shoppers
would be less susceptible to dialogical reasoning than voters. Perhaps the
more problematic difference between voters and consumers is that the
former cast a ballot, whereas the latter vote with the pocketbook.
3.2 What money can buy
Citizens should have the same opportunity to influence political outcomes,
yet political consumer activism is biased towards the well off, critics claim
(Hussain, 2012: 118; Stolle and Hooghe, 2006: 284). Given that money is
unequally distributed among people in a society, the analogy between
consumption choices and democratic elections, which underlies the notion
Beckstein: Political Consumer Activism and Democratic Legitimacy
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of the citizen-consumer, is indeed as cynical as Ludwig von Mises’s (1940:
260; cf. 1998: 271-2) provocation: ‘democratic elections are an imperfect
attempt to simulate the market order in the sphere of politics. In the
economic sphere no vote is cast in vain.’ If pennies are the votes of the
economic sphere, we must conclude that the market is a plutocratic, not
democratic order that entails the government of money, for money, and by
money. However, the question is whether the analogy is also flawed in
regard to what assumed to be the relevant power resources in the two
domains (sphere of politics: votes; economic sphere: money). More generally,
we must consider whether opportunities to influence political outcomes
through political consumer activism are really substantially less equal than
those entailing participation in the political sphere.
The procedural value of political equality delegitimizes a number of
ways and means by which privileged actors could (and sometimes do) try
to shape political outcomes. At the same time, the procedural value of
political equality does not prescribe equal influence. ‘Democracy,’ as Michael
Walzer (1983: 309) puts it, ‘requires equal rights, not equal power. Rights
here are guaranteed opportunities to exercise minimal power (voting rights)
or to try to exercise greater power (speech, assembly, petition rights).
Citizens may legitimately try to ‘amplify’ their voice and ‘appropriate’ other
person’s votes by engaging in discussion and demonstration, or by
organizing campaigns in the run-up to elections. The disproportionate
exertion of political influence is a necessary and desirable result as long as
opportunities are to be granted.
While the economic sphere does not offer a guaranteed opportunity
to exercise minimal power, it offers plenty of opportunities to exercise
greater power, and formally speaking, those opportunities are equally
offered to everybody. Due to the grossly uneven shares of wealth in most
Western societies, it is certainly true that the well off can more easily seize
opportunities to exercise political power, meaning that there is no fair
equality of opportunity. However, in the official process of democratic
politics, citizens are also unevenly endowed with the resources necessary
for exerting disproportionate influence, such as rhetorical talent, networking
skills, free time, access to officials, education (i.e. the various stocks of
individual, human, and social capital), and, mutually reinforcing, wealth.
There is every reason to alleviate poverty of all kinds, and more should be
done to curb respective oligopolies; yet the difference between forms of
participation in the political sphere and political consumer activism is one
of degree in regard to the unequal distribution of power resources, not one
of kind. 
Some readers might insist that wealth in financial and productive
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capital is more suitable to distorting democratic processes than individual,
human, or social capital, and therefore argue that the preceding discussion
does not suffice to rule out the objection against extra-legislative political
consumer activism via the norm of political equality. I do not intend to put
an end to this debate but simply to warn against falling prey to an anti-
materialist prejudice that overrates the influence of money in politics as
compared to other resources of power and considers it independent from
them. The idea that one can buy an election with money in Western affluent
societies is an obvious oversimplification of complex processes, and even
accepting the kernel of truth that lies in this proposition, it should still be
remembered that it is usually more efficient to raise money for an election
campaign than to invest one’s own. Analogously, an ‘ethical’ product is
better promoted by organizing a boycott than by privately purchasing it in
bulk. Also to be taken into consideration is the fact that, historically, political
activism in the economic sphere has primarily been associated with the
underprivileged. According to Machiavelli (1998: 15, I.4), one of the most
efficient ways for common people to make themselves heard in Ancient
Rome and the Renaissance city states consisted in disturbing the ordered life
of the market place. In addition, boycotts were first systematically organized
by the then (in effect) disenfranchised African Americans (e.g. the boycott
of slave-produced goods in 1830, or the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955).
In the face of these experiences, one problematic aspect of political consumer
activism might be that it offers opportunities for political participation to
people who are not in the possession of full citizenship rights, such as
adolescents and transnational activists.11
3.3 Withholding money, undermining liberties?
Perhaps the role of money in political consumer activism is problematic in
another, namely negative regard. Forms of political consumer activism such
as boycotts (or divestment) lend weight to social pressure in that not only is
social recognition withheld, but sales revenues too. In contrast to other ways
of exerting social pressure such as hate speech, market power is used in a
strategy of siege warfare that threatens loss of income, and perhaps
bankruptcy. Thus, the use of financial pressure may allow political activists
to effectively exact compliance even with social agendas that essentially
contradict liberal-democratic principles. To illustrate this problem, scholars
have referred to the 1933 Nazi boycott of Jewish shops in Germany. The
‘Don’t buy Jewish’ campaign, Hussain (2012: 117–8) argues, ‘deprived
members of the Jewish community of their religious freedom by making it
exceedingly difficult for them to practice their religion openly and to
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associate with their co-religionists. Many eventually had to hide their beliefs
and affiliations.’12 Less extreme but still indicative of this problem with
political consumer activism are contemporary popular boycotts of
companies in the name of liberal cosmopolitan labor standards.
Scapegoating a company for non-compliance with non-juridified (i.e. non-
legally binding) ethical standards, consumer activists betray the promise that
the market is free to all comers who respect local law and thus deprive the
company’s owners of their economic liberty. In addition, they violate the
principle that prosecution must not be selective by imposing a fine on a
particularly visible and therefore vulnerable company in isolation. In the
face of such examples it seems not unreasonable to demand that liberal
democracies find ways to bar political consumer activists from placing their
bargaining power and state-guaranteed property rights in the service of
partisan causes. ‘If the public condition does not allow a group of individuals
to enact certain rules through legislation, then it should also prevent them
(in some way) from imposing these same rules on society through
nonstandard uses of their market powers’ (Hussain, 2012: 122).
Contrary to the initial impression, however, the 1933 Nazi boycott of
Jewish shops is not a good example for supporting the argument, and the
reasons why this is so cast doubt on the validity of the argument the example
is meant to illustrate. The boycott, taken in isolation, did not affect members
of the Jewish community in the way Hussain suggests. The Nazi press soon
admitted that the campaign had not yielded the desired effects. In fact, the
sales of Jewish shops were thought to have increased on average
(Friedländer, 2007: 34). Moreover, it is very likely that the boycott had been
orchestrated from behind the scenes by the Nazi regime, which deliberately
attempted to abolish the liberal social order. To this purpose, the regime
issued racial laws incrementally, starting a week after the boycott. Hence, it
was the regime that effectively (and by means of legislation) deprived
members of the Jewish community of their basic liberties, not some political
consumer activists (through nonstandard uses of market power).
Leaving the historical case aside, it is difficult to see how political
consumer activism could possibly have the problematic effects Hussain
warns about. First of all, it should be noted that most liberal democracies
today do include means to prevent the promotion of discriminatory social
norms. Racist boycotts (as well as non-market-based agitation against
religious or ethnic minorities), are illegal under hate crime law (in post-world
War Two Germany with §130 StGb ‘Volksverhetzung’). Second, the rules
enacted through extra-legislative political consumer activism differ in an
important respect from the rules enacted through legislation: the costs of
violating social norms are substantially lower than the costs of violating legal
norms. An influential food critic may refuse to include non-vegetarian
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restaurants in her rankings in the name of animal rights, and successfully
campaign for fellow food and gourmets critics to do the same. Meat-serving
restaurants would be ostracized by a vegetarian hegemony, but the option
of non-compliance with the vegetarian norm and counter-activism (i.e.
buycotts) would remain unimpaired as long as vegetarianism is not
enforced. Moreover, we should be clear, boycotts do not inflict financial
harm; boycotts do not show on the liabilities side of the balance sheet of firms
but only as unrealized expected revenues. The product of a boycotted firm,
for the most part, simply fails to appeal sufficiently to its potential target
group.
Finally, we need to take into account that even boycotts—as an extra-
legislative form of political consumer activism—are more about sending
warning signals (voice) than changing consumption habits (exit). The
boycotter’s route to success is to ‘alert customers,’ much in the way
Hirschman (1981: 24) describes the exit function from a management
perspective: ‘The alert customers provide the firm with a feedback
mechanism which starts the effort at recuperation while the inert customers
provide it with the time and dollar cushion needed for this effort to come to
fruition.’ However, the difference between alert consumers and political
consumer activists lies in the fact that boycotters exploit the insights of
economic theory and capitalize on companies’ expectation of the existence
of ‘inert (yet mobilizable) customers.’ Activists mean to raise fellow
consumers’ and providers’ awareness in equal measure; the call for boycott,
as it were, supports the firm in its search for the precise cause of customer
withdrawal that boycotters themselves caused in the first place. Were
boycotters to mobilize all customers at once the activism would be bound to
fail, because the firm would be ruined before it could identify and amend
the contested business practice. In other words, exit-based forms of political
consumer activism is essentially a non-verbal form of communication, and
the relationship of exit-based political consumer activists and firms is one of
strategic cooperation through an interplay of exit and voice options, rather
than a unilaterally-imposed monetary penalization.13
4 – Diversifying citizens’ repertoire of contention
In sum, there is little indication that political consumer activism infringe on
the procedural values of democratic morality under the conditions of a
liberal order¾even if it is not limited to informing governmental legislation.
Political consumer activism might be problematic from other perspectives
that have not been considered in this article. Yet with this proviso in mind,
it can be concluded that there is no reason to restrict the legitimate space for
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consumer activism to ‘waiting rooms’ for official democratic processes.
Rather, we should further inquire how the liberties available in ‘under-
regulated’ market economies could complement traditional channels of
political articulation. Josiah Ober’s (2008) interpretation of ancient Greek
democracy—namely that democracy meant majority rule to its enemies,
while its advocates stressed that citizens were endowed with ‘a capacity to
do things’—is a useful starting point for this endeavor, given that the
diversification of citizens’ repertoire of contention is one of the more
promising tools for increasing this capacity today. This is especially so if we
believe that even established liberal democracies require further
democratization, or acknowledge that political systems, in a changing world,
must reinvent themselves in order to remain faithful to their principles. For
this purpose, I consider two implications of the previous discussion
especially important.
First, we should avoid overrating the role that money plays in political
consumer activism and, relatedly, refrain from misunderstanding political
consumer activism as a form of voting with the pocketbook or shopping for
change. The titles of pertinent books, book chapters, and articles are telling
when it comes to this widespread misunderstanding: Supermarket Activism,
Political Virtue and Shopping, Politics in the Supermarket, Politik mit dem
Einkaufswagen (‘Politics with the shopping trolley’), Radical Consumption:
Shopping for Change, Shopping for Justice (Baringhorst et al. 2007; Hertz 2002:
145–58; Hilton 2009: Ch. 8; Littler 2009; Micheletti 2003; Stolle et al. 2005).
Nothing is wrong with a sharp focus, but none of these studies limits itself
to practices of shopping. Instead, ‘shopping’ is employed as pars pro toto for
diverse forms of political consumer activism, ranging from supermarket
activism over boycotts/buycotts, anti-consumerism (e.g. aggressive recycling,
saving, downshifting), anti-commercial iconoclasm, and culture jamming,
right up to socially responsible investment, shareholder meeting activism,
and certification and labeling schemes. These heterogeneous ways of
expressing normative support or opposition to products and services, or
consumption and business practices, are poorly described as purchasing
decisions. Yet more important than accurate terminology, when we employ
a rhetorical device that uses a part to stand for the whole, is making sure
that we desist from eventually also thinking the whole through the part.
After all, approaching political consumer activism through shopping entails
the risk of believing that political consumer activism is about purchasing
power and exit rather than organizational talent and voice; that it concerns
routine behavior rather than short term events; that it operates within the
sector of manufactured goods, rather than the sector of services; that it is a
phenomenon of the official economy, rather than grey or black markets and
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therefore necessarily reproduces capitalism, and so forth. In short, taking
into account the variety of forms of political consumer activism requires a
rethinking in terms of both depth and breadth.
Second, we should rethink the relationship of consumers to producers
on the one hand, and democratic governments on the other hand, in a less
antagonistic way. In regard to the consumer–producer relationship, I have
already suggested that even boycotts can plausibly be interpreted in terms
of a playful, cooperative dialogue. Here, I want to add for consideration that
this cooperative spirit also underpins the relationship between consumers
(as well as producers) and democratic governments. The fact that political
consumer activism often seeks to circumvent state-based legislation must
not lead us to overlook the role of governments in providing enabling
structures for extra-legislative forms of activism, especially as governments
in affluent societies appear to be increasingly proactive in this regard. For
about two decades governments have aggressively promoted a re-
territorialization of politics into the economic sphere. Recall, for instance,
how the British and German governments facilitated New Public
Management ideals and privatization policies in the mid-1990s. Arguing that
state administrations willingly shrunk the space of politics by transferring
the provision of public services to the private sector would be to miss the
dialectical nature of the underlying stratagem. Inspired by the Third Way,
the administrations employed actors from the private sector with the
performance of public tasks—not in order to abandon these tasks, but rather
to place them, as it were, at arm’s length from the government’s main remit
(Burnham, 2002; Freeden, 2002; Hobson, 2004). There is of course much
controversy about whether the stratagem worked out well in practice. Yet
while it may be true that governments were downsized as a result, the same
cannot be said of the space of politics, as business has increasingly become
implicated in policy-making and consumers are entrusted with the tasks of
monitoring and implementation. Among other things, the British and
German governments have spent millions establishing platforms for
consumer–producer dialogue, mobilizing consumer and corporate social
responsibility activists, or dragging consumers and business actors into the
firing line in yet other ways. Examples include Labour’s 1999 ‘Are you doing
your bit?’ campaign, the 2003 ‘Fair Feels Good’ campaign by the Schröder
administration, or the 2011 ‘Echt gerecht. Clever kaufen’ initiative under
Merkel. Similarly, the contracting-out of policy-making (such as, for instance,
the British Department of Health’s 2010 decision to have policy on alcohol
and diet-related diseases written by drink manufacturers and fast-food
companies such as Diageo, PepsiCo, McDonald’s, and Kentucky Fried Chicken),
testifies to a remarkable eagerness among government officials to experiment
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with the simultaneous privatization of governmental competencies and
responsibilization of economic actors. 
These examples show that penetration of the political sphere by the
logic of the market is accompanied by an increasing politicization of
economic relations. They also cast doubt on accounts that see market-based
political activism as the result of economic agents seizing power and
attempting to fill governance gaps. While certainly true in parts, the other
half of the story might be that the politicization of economic relations is part
of an educative therapy prescribed by governments aiming to rehabilitate
hyper-acquisitive business people as well as privatistic consumers. If so,
political philosophers will have to confront Walzer with Polanyi and
reconsider whether the democratic cause is better served by governments
isolating the economy from social life or re-embedding the economy in social
life, by aligning all politics to governmental legislation or by pluralizing the
sites of political contention.
Martin Beckstein (martin.beckstein@philos.uzh.ch) is Postdoctoral
Assistant for Political Philosophy at the University of Zurich.
Endnotes
1 For similar considerations, see Clarke (2008).
2 A similar claim is made by Micheletti (2003: 16).
3 The forms and strategies of political consumer activism are manifold,
ranging from customer activism and boycotts related to anti-consumerism
and culture jamming to transnational standard-setting bodies and labelling
or certification schemes. It is important to keep in mind this heterogeneity
when talking about political consumer activism¾a point that will be
enlarged upon in the conclusions section. 
4 My distinction between ethical consumerism and political consumer
activism is based on that given by Hussain; but it diverges from that account
in two regards: First, I stress the importance of a somewhat plausible theory
of causation, because otherwise we would have to conceptually integrate
practices such as praying for change into the repertoire of the contention of
citizens. Second, as will be made clear in the concluding section, I refrain
from conceptualizing political consumption practices as purchasing
decisions. However, Hussain (2012: 111) defines political consumer activism
(in his formulation: ‘social change ethical consumerism’) as purchasing
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decisions that are taken in order ‘to advance some moral, social,
environmental, or other nonmarket agenda’ by ‘chang[ing] the way that
other people behave.’ 
5 For Schmitt’s critique of state-centric conceptions of politics see Arditi
(2003) and Beckstein (2011: 39).
6 Cf. Walzer (1983: 294–301). A more moderate position can also be found in
many studies that address the ‘democratic deficit’ of nongovernmental
organizations and the new modes of governance more generally. See, in
particular, Swyngedouw (2005).
7 It is interesting to note that the same logic feeds Milton Friedman’s (1970:
125) famous critique of corporate social responsibility initiatives. Managers
who try to advance nonmarket agendas, he argues, are ‘seeking to attain by
un democratic procedures what they cannot attain by democratic pro ce -
dures.’
8 Hussain (2012: 122 fn. 16) makes this claim explicit.
9 For the logic and strategies of culture jamming see Klein (2010) and Lasn
(2000).
10 A well-documented case illustrating that political consumer activism is not
politics without discussion is the Nike Sweatshop email. In 2000 the Nike
corporation launched the Nike iD campaign, an online service that provides
personalized shoes, claiming to be ‘about freedom to choose and freedom to
express who you are.’ Jonah Peretti challenged the corporation’s word and
requested a pair of shoes customized with the word ‘sweatshop’ on the sides.
Nike, unsurprisingly, refused his request. Yet because Peretti’s product order
did not contradict the guidelines of the Nike iD campaign, the corporation
was forced to resort to rather tenuous arguments (‘material ... we simply do
not want to place on our products’), and the email correspondence made its
way around the world, reaching more than 11 million email accounts,
according to estimations. See Peretti (2006).
11 Given the present discussion’s focus on the procedural values of
democratic morality, this consideration is not pursued further.
12 A similar argument is made by Micheletti (2008: 26–7).
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13 The impurity of exit-based forms of consumer activism has also been
noted, however with critical intent, by Patrick West (2004) and Ingolfur
Blühdorn (2006). They argue that ‘new’ forms of political participation such
as political consumer activism should be primarily understood in terms of a
complacent conversation with fellow citizens, rather than an earnest attempt
to actually change something.
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